中文摘要：

虽然已有研究表明控股股东对公司会计信息质量具有重要影响，但很少深入分析控股股东在获取共享收益时如何影响公司会计信息质量，也没有考察控股股东实施影响的特定渠道。文章考察控股股东委派董事这一特定渠道在实现控股股东共享收益目标时，对于公司盈余管理行为的监督是否表现出非对称性。文章使用中国资本市场上市公司2014—2011年的数据进行检验，研究结果表明当公司高管向上操纵盈余时，控股股东委派董事发挥了有效的监督作用，显著降低了高管的盈余管理行为；但当公司高管向下操纵盈余时，控股股东委派董事并没有发挥监督作用。使用工具变量控制内生性问题与分组测试的结果表明结果具有稳健性。进一步测试控股股东委派董事与高管薪酬业绩敏感性之间的关系，结果表明当公司高管向上操纵盈余时，控股股东委派董事并没有加强高管薪酬业绩敏感性；只有当公司高管向下操纵盈余时，控股股东委派董事才会加强高管薪酬业绩敏感性。文章结论对于理解公司董事会构成和治理功能的发挥具有现实意义。

英文摘要：

Though extant studies confirm the important effects of controlling shareholders on corporate accounting information quality, few deeply analyze how controlling shareholders affect corporate accounting information quality when obtaining shared benefits and the specific channels of exerting the effect. This paper investigates the existence of asymmetry of directors affiliated to controlling shareholders supervision of corporate earnings management when realizing shared benefits of controlling shareholders. By the data of listed companies in Chinese capital market from 2004 to 2011, it makes a test and arrives at the conclusions as follows： when executives ma nipulate earnings upward, directors affiliated to controlling shareholders play an effective supervi sion role and significantly reduces earnings management of executives; but when executives ma nipulate earnings downward, directors affiliated to controlling shareholders do not play the supervision role. After controlling endogenous issue by using instrumental variables, the results of subgroup test confirm the robustness of the conclusions. Further test of the relationship between directors affili ated to controlling shareholders and executive payperformance sensitivity shows that when exec utives manipulate earnings upward, directors affiliated to controlling shareholders do not strengthen the executive payperformance sensitivity; only when executives manipulate earnings downward, directors affiliated to controlling shareholders can strengthen the executive payper formance sensitivity. It provides actual significance for the understanding of board structure and the exertion of board governance.