中文摘要：

基于我国国有企业经理人特有的“59岁现象”，本文从股东监督和薪酬契约角度研究了经理人缺乏职业前景激励时在职消费的变化。研究发现，就全样本而言，我国国有企业经理人退休前在职消费并非显著更高。分样本研究表明：（1）超额薪酬高并不能降低经理人在职消费；（2）当经理人在股东单位兼职，从而导致股东单侮缺乏监督的独立性；或者薪酬弹性缺乏、持股强度不足时，面临退休的国有企业经理人在职消费显著更高。本文的研究发现，不仅有助于丰富经理人激励的相关文献；同时，对我国国有企业经理人激励与监督制度建设亦具有重要的政策意义。

英文摘要：

With reference to the unique ＂age 59 phenomenon＂ among managers of Chinese state- owned enterprises （SOEs）, this article studies the change in perks from the perspectives of shareholder monitoring and compensation contracts when managers are not concerned about their career. The study finds that in the full sample, there is no evidence to show that perks are significantly higher in Chinese SOEs before a manager＇s retirement. The subsample study shows that （1） excessive compensation does not help to reduce perks; （2） a manager who concurrently takes a post in a shareholder＇s entity weakens the independence of shareholder monitoring, and perks increase remarkably before a manager＇s retirement when there is a lack of compensation elasticity and inadequate shareholder monitoring. Our findings not only enrich the literature on managerial incentives but also provide important political implications regarding the construction of an incentive and monitoring system for managers of Chinese SOEs.