中文摘要：

本文通过手工收集的数据，实证检验了我国上市公司章程中反收购条款的设置与公司代理成本之间的关系。研究结果表明，从整体来讲，金色降落伞条款的设立是对公司管理层的一种保护，不利于投资者利益的保护。公司治理对金色降落伞条款的效应有影响：民营企业设立金色降落伞条款，不利于降低代理成本。但前十大股东持股比例越高，设定金色降落伞条款越不利于降低代理成本。限制提名董事人选的股东资格条款、交错董事会条款、绝对多数条款对于降低上市公司代理成本没有显著的影响。本文的研究结论为法与金融文献提供了公司层面的法律规章同样对投资者利益保护有影响的我国上市公司的经验证据，也将促使我国理论界、立法机构和监管部门重新思考公司层面的法律规章的合理性和可能存在的问题。

英文摘要：

With the completion of the reform of non-tradable shares, the biggest obstacle to hostile takeover has disappeared in China, listed companies faces the threat of takeover will be bigger and bigger, takeover and anti-takeover has become the theme of Chinese capital market. In international comparison research under the framework of law and finance, there is a information distortion problem in corporate level of legal protection for investors. The company＇s charter is the ＂constitution＂ of a company, is the effective contract balancing the relationship between investors and management. Therefore, by increasing or decreasing some provisions of the company＇s charter, to prevent some behavior of the management or the con- trolling shareholder, to improve the investor protection degree of the national level. Whether or not listed companies use anti-takeover correctly, not only relates to the future development of listed companies, more will affect Chinese capital market order. However, research related to the impact of the company＇s charter on the right of the investors protection is less in Chi- na. The paper examines the relationship between the set of anti-takeover provisions in the charter of listed companies with the agency costs by using the manually collecting data. The results show that the the golden parachutes terms will protect the company＇s management not the investors. However, the terms of the set of golden parachutes will strengthen the nature of the largest shareholder and equity checks and balances on the role of corporate governance,help to reduce agency costs. The establishment of the anti-takeover provisions, such as re- strict the shareholder eligibility provisions of nominating candidates for directorship, stag- gered terms and conditions of the board, and the vast majority of the terms did not signifi- cantly reduce the agency costs of listed companies, and did not play its due role. The conclu- sions of this study provides Chinese listed companies empirical evidences that a corporat