中文摘要：

家族企业的两类代理问题是家族企业区别于其他类型企业的特色之一。文章以深市上市家族企业为研究对象，对家族控制权与代理效率之间的关系，以及股权在家族成员之间的配置中的调节作用进行了实证研究。结果表明，控制性家族对企业控制权的增强有助于提高代理效率。内部股权集中度对家族控制权与代理效率之间的关系起到了显著正向调节作用，这表明家族控制权在内部权力分配集中的阶段对代理效率的贡献更强；另一方面也说明家族内部权力分配的不平等性并不一定会损害家族企业的治理效率，对于家族控制权更高的企业，适度的权力集中分配会对家族企业的发展提供有效的支持。

英文摘要：

In family firms, there are two types of agency problems, which make those enterprises differ from other types of the firms. This paper takes SZSE - listed family firms as the research object, studying the relationship between family control and its agency efficiency, also empirically tested the moderating effect of the internal ownership distribution among family members. The results show that the controlling family enhancement of enterprise control could be used to improve the agent efficiency. Internal equity concentration has played a significant positive moderating role on the relationship between family control and the agency efficiency. This suggests that family control in internal power distribution concentrated phase contribution to the agent efficiency is stronger; On the other hand, family internal power distribution inequality does not necessarily damage the family corporate governance. For the high family - controlled firms, the moderate concentration of inter - family power allocation can provide effective support to the development of family business.