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中文摘要：
允许外资银行进入可能与国内银行市场本身缺乏竞争所引发的整体银行效率不断下降，进而导致限制外资银行进入的成本增加相关。本文参照Montinola等（2001）的理论框架，提出了三个有关外资银行进入的理论命题并运用面板数据包络技术以及Malmquist指数对中国12家主要银行引进国外战略投资者的效果进行经验分析，发现中国国内银行效率的下降确实导致了对外资银行进入管制的放松，但目前外资银行进入对国内银行总体效率影响还不明显，门槛效应可能存在。
英文摘要：
The liberalization of foreign bank entry may result in a fall of domestic bank efficiency caused by lack of competition, which then lead to the increases of costs to restriction on foreign bank entry. Based on Montinola＇s （ 2001 ） and other models, the paper put forward three hypotheses to explain the foreign bank entry, and apply panel DEA and the Malmquist Index to test the foreign bank entry effect of 12 banks in China by introducing foreign strategy investor. The authors conclude that the fall of domestic bank efficiency lead to the deregulation of foreign bank entry. But so far the effect of liberalization of foreign banks on the efficiency of domestic banks is modest which implied that a threshold effect might exist.
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