中文摘要：

运用博弈论相关知识,对产业技术创新联盟中企业与高校及科研院所双方的信任合作进行了一次性博弈和无限次重复博弈分析,在此基础上,引入政府这个外在环境因素,阐述了政府的介入对于企业和高校双方信任博弈的影响。分析结果显示,一次性博弈中,企业和高校都会选择＂不信任＂的帕累托低效均衡解;无限次重复博弈,企业和高校都会选择＂信任＂的帕累托最优均衡解,双方均走出了一次性博弈时的困境;而政府的介入,对于联盟成员具有非常显著的约束力,会影响博弈双方的策略选择。针对产业技术创新联盟在合作过程中存在的由于缺乏信任导致的联盟效率低、失败率高、稳定性不足等诸多问题,健全产业技术创新联盟内的信任机制对整个产业技术创新联盟高效运转至关重要。应当从法律基础建设、信用评价体系构建、政府介入等方面促进产业技术创新联盟信任机制的建立与完善。

英文摘要：

By using the one-off game model and the infinitely repeated game model in the game theory, this paper analyzes the trust and cooperation between the enterprises and the universities （or research institutes） in the Industrial Technology Innovation Alli- ance （ITIA）. Furthermore, this paper introduces the government as an external factor, and analyzes the impact of government＇s in- volvement in the trust game between the enterprises and the universities. From the results, we find that ： in one-off game, both the en- terprises and the universities will choose the Pareto inefficient equilibrium solution, which means ＂to distrust＂ each other; in infinitely repeated games, they will get out of the dilemma posed by one-off game. and choose the Pareto optimal equilibrium solution, which means ＂to trust＂ each other; with the government＇s involvement, the alliance members will be greatly influenced on their strategies in the game. To address the problems of low efficiency, high failure rate, lack of stability, etc. , which rises from the lack of trust within the alliance, the most crucial issue is to improve the trust mechanism in the （ITIA）. In the conclusion, we suggest to promote the cre- ation and improvement of the trust mechanism in the ITIA from various aspects, especially from legal infrastructure, credit rating system construction and government＇s involvement.