中文摘要：

针对当前研究较少从属性层次来研究突发事件中的舆情传播问题，本文运用突发事件的结构化描述方法从属性层次分析了舆情的产生和传播的动力学机制，进而分别建立了传播主体的决策行为和博弈关系的结构化描述框架。然后，考虑传播主体的认知差异，运用演化博弈论方法分别对社会公众之间及社会公众与政府部门之间的博弈关系进行了研究。最后，运用实际案例对理论研究的有效性进行了验证，并运用数值仿真考查了该案例中博弈主体的认知差异对博弈均衡的影响。

英文摘要：

Few of existed studies pay attention to the public opinion in emergency from the perspective of e- mergency attributes. The dynamic mechanism of public opinion＇s generation and propagation is firstly ana- lyzed in the view of attributes by applying structural description of emergency. And structural description frameworks are constructed respectively for decision behavior and game relationship among propagation bodies. Then, cognitive differences are considered in different propagation bodies, and its utility function is introduced. Next, the game relationship is studied among the public, and the game relationship between the public and government departments through the approach of evolutionary game theory. Results show that the evolutionary equilibrium of the two kinds of game systems are respectively affected by the return functions of two game parties under different strategies combinations~ both the systems have different evo- lutionary equilibrium under different constraints, and the government departments should choose the right moment when implementing their intervention strategies~ the central government can conduct the related government departments to perform their duties better by taking appropriate rewards and punishments to them. Furthermore, numerical examples are taken to verify that cognitive differences have great influence on the game equilibrium. Finally, a case study of public opinion propagation is investigated to verify the validity of the conclusion. The results of this study can not only provide theoretical support for revealing the public opinioffs generation mechanism and propagation law, but also provide reference for the govern- ment to guide or control the evolution direction of public opinion.