中文摘要：

日益频发的群体性突发事件已严重影响到中国的社会和谐和公共安全. 针对群体性突发事件中不同社会群体的利益博弈问题,基于演化博弈理论研究群体性突发事件中强势群体和弱势群体两类异质群体策略选择的演化过程,建立未引入上级政府惩罚机制和引入上级政府惩罚机制两种情景下的群体性突发事件演化博弈模型,对比分析强势群体与弱势群体行为策略的演化稳定均衡,基于数值仿真对模型进行情景推演模拟. 研究结果表明,未引入上级政府惩罚机制情景下,当强势群体采取强硬策略的成本与信誉损失成本之和超过其获得收益和对采取抗争策略的弱势群体惩罚成本之和,并且弱势群体通过抗争获得的收益小于其采取抗争策略的成本时,两个异质群体将最终选择合作策略;当强势群体采取强硬策略的收益超过其行动成本、信誉损失和提供补偿成本之和,且弱势群体通过抗争获得收益超过其行动成本、获得补偿和支付惩罚成本之和时,两个异质群体将选择强硬 -抗争策略;两群体策略演化速度与策略选择初始比例有直接关系,在初始状态选择策略比例相同情况下,弱势群体均比强势群体更快演化至均衡策略. 引入上级政府惩罚机制情景下,当上级政府惩罚力度高于强势群体采取强硬策略获得的收益与其行动成本、信誉损失成本和对弱势群体补偿成本之差值,且同时高于弱势群体采取抗争策略获得收益与其行动成本差值时,两个异质群体都将最终选择合作策略;随着施加的惩罚增大,对弱势群体策略演化的影响不再显著,而对强势群体策略演化的影响却显著增加. 研究结论为群体性突发事件情景 -应对提供重要决策理论支持.

英文摘要：

Unexpected incidents involving mass participation have impacted China′s social harmony and public safety.Aiming at the benefit game problem of different social groups in unexpected incidents involving mass participation, we study the strategy se-lection process of two types of social groups, i.e.the social powerful group and social vulnerable group, based on evolution game theory.Then this paper establishes the evolutionary game model of unexpected incidents involving mass participation under the scenario with or without the higher levels of government′s punishment mechanism, and analyzes the behavior strategy stability of the two heterogeneous groups.Finally, this paper introduces evolutionary status of unexpected incidents involving mass participa-tion for scenario inference simulations, the results show that：Under the scenario without the higher government′s punishment mechanism,①if the costs and credit losses by taking tough poli-cies are higher than the benefits and punishment costs on the vulnerable groups who adopt the struggle strategy.Moreover the benefits of the social vulnerable groups by taking the struggle strategy are less than the costs, then the two heterogeneous groups will ultimately choose cooperative strategies;②if the benefits by taking tough policies of the social powerful group exceed the sum of the action costs, credit losses and compensation costs, meanwhile the benefits of the social vulnerable group by taking the struggle strategy exceed the sum of the costs including the action, compensation and penalty, then the two heterogeneous groups will select the tough struggle strategy;③the strategy evolutionary velocities of the two heterogeneous groups are directly related with the initial proportion of policies selections.Given the same tactics proportion, the speed of stable strategy evolutionary of the social vulnerable group is faster than that of the powerful group. Under the scenario with the higher government′s punishment mechanism, ①if the punishment costs of superio