中文摘要：

针对群体性突发事件在不确定环境下的演化问题,基于演化博弈理论研究了群体性突发事件中强势群体与弱势群体策略选择的演化过程,依据复制动态方程得到了两个群体的行为演化规律。考虑到群体性突发事件演化过程中的随机扰动,引入高斯白噪声来反映群体性突发事件演化过程中受到的随机干扰,建立了不确定环境下群体性突发事件的随机演化博弈模型,分析了弱势群体与强势群体行为策略的稳定性。运用随机Taylor展开理论和It^o型随机微分方程对模型进行了求解,并对模型进行情景仿真模拟,研究结果表明：在不确定环境下,受随机因素的干扰影响,当采取抗争策略成本较大时,随着白噪声强度减小,弱势群体会较快妥协,采取合作策略;当采取强硬策略获取额外收益较大时,随着白噪声强度增大,强势群体更倾向于采取强硬策略。结合不同情景仿真结果,为群体性突发事件“情景-应对”提供相关决策建议。

英文摘要：

In order to solve the evolutionary problems of unexpected incidents involving mass participation under uncertain environment, the strategy developing process of social powerful group and vulnerable group in the unexpected incidents is considered based on evolutionary game, and the behavior evolutionary rule of two groups is developed by dynamic replication equation. Taking into account the evolution of mass incidents of random disturbance, the Gaussian white noise is iutroduced to reflect random disturbance. The paper builds a stochastic evolutionary game model of unexpected incidents involving mass participation under uncertain environment, and analyzes the behavioral stability of social powerful group and vulnerable group. The model is solved by the stochastic Taylor expanded theory and It~ stochastic differential equations theory, and we takes different evolutionary status of mass incidents for scenario derivation simulation. The main conclusions are the followings： the social system is effected by random disturbance under uncertain environment, when social vulnerable group takes the larger cost of struggle strategy with the intensity of white noise decreasing rapidly, which would take cooperation strategy ; when powerful groups obtained the larger additional revenue of strategy with the intensity of white noise increasing rapidly, they would take tough strategy responding to the unexpected incidents involving mass Finally, the paper provides decision-making support for participation in ＂scenario-response＂.