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中文摘要：
采用拍卖方法来进行资源分配是多Agent系统研究中的重要问题．基于广义的多属性拍卖模型，提出了一种递增叫价的多属性拍卖方法——MAE．对MAE中卖方和买方的策略和效用进行了分析，进而证明了MAE的一些重要性质．例如卖方和买方满足独立理性，且都有接近最优的策略，在这一组策略下买方和卖方的总效用接近最大．将MAE与已有的多属性拍卖方法进行了比较，结果表明MAE改进了Esther David的工作，并且说明MAE是一种可以取代MAV的递增叫价多属性拍卖方法．
英文摘要：
Use auction methods to allocate resources among self-interested agents efficiently and reasonably is one of the challenges of multi-agent systems. Multi-attribute auctions extend traditional auction settings to allow negotiation over non-price attributes such as weight, color, size in addition to price. Based on a generalized multi-attribute auction model, an auction method-MAE is provided. MAE is an extension for English auction from single attribute to multi-attribute. Strategies and profits of buyer and sellers in MAE. Some main properties of MAE are proved. Buyers and sellers are individually rational in MAE. Buyers and sellers have nearly optimal strategies. The total profit of buyers and sellers is nearly optimal with the given strategies. Compared with Esther David＇s works, MAE has a more generalized model. Compared with the MAV auction, MAE is more transparent for sellers. Seller＇s strategy in MAE is more intuitive than in MAV.
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