中文摘要：

在对经典理论和现实背景概括分析的基础上,把银行信贷从企业负债中独立出来,以市场化程度较高地区的企业——广东上市公司为样本,以2005年中国上市公司股权分置改革的时间为时间节点,明确研究银行债权对经理层的监督效应及其变化轨迹。研究证明,由于中国现实背景和改革的复杂性,银行债权对经理层的监督效应既有符合经典理论,即符合市场化规律的一面,又有不符合经典理论,即不符合完全的市场化规律的一面;近年来银行债权的经理层监督效应的改进程度并不十分明显,尤其是民营公司和短期贷款。这说明,股权分置改革带来的效果仍然十分有限,改革仍然任重道远,尤其是资本市场与企业（特别是民营企业）的规范化与信用建设问题,成为亟待解决的问题,必须进一步推进包括完善银行债权监督在内的相关改革。

英文摘要：

Based on classical theories and realistic background, separating the bank credits out of all the liabilities, taking the listed companies in Guangdong as samples, which from a higher market degree areas, and taking the year of 2005 as the time node, in which the tradable share reform of China＇s listed companies is started, the supervision effects on managers and their trajectory of the bank debts, are specifically studied. The Studies showed that, due to the com- plexity of China＇s real background and the reform, the supervision effects on managers of bank claims are both in line with classical theories, that is, in line with the market law, and not meet the classical theories, that is, not meet the full market - oriented rules. In recent years, the improvement degree of the supervision effects on managers of the bank claims is not very obvious, especially in private companies and short - term loans. This shows that the effects of the split share reform are still very limited, the task of reform remains heavy and complex, especially the standardization and credit building of the capital markets and enterprises （ especially private enterprises） have become problems urgently need to be solved.