中文摘要：

运用博弈论分析不确定条件下供应链成员的信息共享技术策略。首先建立基于需求不确定和供应不确定两种参数的“供应商＋零售商”的期望收益模型，证实在不确定条件下的存在双方期望收益的最优解；建立三阶段博弈模型，探讨双方信息共享技术策略的博弈关系；分析四种的均衡状态：探讨初始需求不确定性、供应商的信息推测能力与零售商收益的不同关系对双方信息共享技术策略的影响，结论显示：当初始需求不确定性较大时，零售商以拒绝策略为先，进一步的策略取决于供应商的信息推测能力及其对零售商收益的影响，如果该能力较强，零售商将采取接受策略，反之则反。

英文摘要：

This paper applies game theory to analyze the information sharing technology strategy of the members on the supply chain. Firstly, it constructs the expected profits models of the supplier and retailer based on two types of parameters of demand and supply uncertainty, and confirms that there are optimal solutions of the expected profits under the uncertain conditions. Secondly, it develops a game-theoretic model of three phrases in order to study the relation of information sharing technology strategies adopted by the members on the supply chain. Thirdly, it discusses four equilibrium statuses, and the result shows. If initial uncertainty is high, information withholding is a viable strategy for the retailer, but this strategy can backfire through the supplier speculating the retailer＇s market, the retailer will adopt an information sharing strategy when the supplier can know more about the market.