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中文摘要：
知识产权质押融资是解决高新技术企业融资难的新途径。在金融机构和高新技术企业仅具有有限理性的前提下，本文运用演化博弈方法，建立了我国高新技术企业知识产权质押融资行为的演化博弈模型，对高新技术企业知识产权质押融资的均衡情况、策略选择和影响因素进行了分析。研究发现，高新技术企业知识产权质押融资行为选择演化系统既可以收敛到帕累托最优均衡状态，也可以收敛帕累托劣均衡状态；通过调节模型中的参数可以达到怕累托最优均衡状态。相对于政府的补贴机制，风险补偿机制更为有效，更能够促进高新技术企业知识产权质押融资的实现。
英文摘要：
Intellectual property pledge financing is a new way to solve the high- teeh enterprises financing difficulties. Given the assumption that high- teeh enterprises and financial institutions have bounded rationality, the article analyzes the equilibriums, optimal strategy choice and influencing factors between high- tech enterprises and financial institutions based on evolutionary game model. The conclusions reveal that the evolution system converges in two types of patterns： Pareto optimal equilibrium and Pareto inferior equilibrium. By adjusting the decision pararaeters, the intellectual property pledge financing behavior between high- tech enterprises and financial institutions can be optimized. With respect to the government＇s subsidy mechanism, risk compensation mechanism will be more efficient, better able to promote high- teeh enterprises intellectual property pledge to achieve financing. Furthermore, this paper puts forward several suggestions based the results.
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