中文摘要：

分别以私营企业与股份制企业为研究对象,探讨过度自信管理者的最优投资决策以及激励性薪酬契约的设计问题。研究发现：随着过度自信水平的不断增加,私营企业中过度自信管理者对风险项目的投资金额会不断增加;股份制企业中激励过度自信管理者对风险项目进行预判并投资的薪酬随着过度自信水平的增加而减少;股份制企业中过度自信管理者最优投资金额会随着过度自信水平的不断增加而减小。

英文摘要：

Thus respectively to private enterprise and joint-stock enterprise as the research background, this paper discusses overconfident managers＇ investment decisions and overconfidence managers＇ incentive compensation contracts. The results show that with the increase of overconfidence level, the investment amount that managers make in the private enterprise will continue to expand; in the Joint-stock enterprise, compensation which incents overconfident managers anticipating and investing will decrease with the increase of overconfidence level; overconfident managers＇ optimal investment amount will decrease with the increase of overconfidence level in the Joint-stock enterprise.