中文摘要：

在不完全信息条件下,建立了风险投资公司、银行与创业企业三者之间的委托代理模型,证明了风险投资公司的监督比例存在一个临界值,并分析了创业企业家过度自信心理特征与风险投资公司监督努力对各参与方委托代理关系的影响作用。研究表明：在三方参与约束条件下,当风险投资公司监督比例小于临界值并且监督对投资成功的影响作用大于增值服务的作用时,风险投资公司的监督努力会提升创业企业和银行参与投资的意愿;创业企业家过度自信行为会提升银行和风险投资公司参与投资的意愿。在双向道德危害情况下,当风险投资公司监督比例小于临界值并且监督对投资成功的影响作用大于增值服务的作用时,风险投资公司的监督努力会提升其最优努力水平与权益分配比例;创业企业家过度自信行为会提升其最优努力水平,并会降低风险投资公司的最优权益分配比例。

英文摘要：

This paper establishes principal-agent relationships among venture capitalist,bank and entrepreneur under the condition of incomplete information,proves that there exist the critical value of venture capitalists＇ supervision,and then analyzes the impact of entrepreneurs＇ overconfidence,venture capitalists＇ supervising efforts on the relationships among venture capitalist,bank and entrepreneur.It shows that,in case of three participants,when the proportion of venture capitalists＇ supervision is smaller than the critical value and the effect of supervision from venture capitalist is greater than the effect of the added service function,venture capitalists＇ supervision makes entrepreneur and bank more willing to be involved in the investment;entrepreneurs＇ overconfidence makes venture capitalist and bank more willing to be involved in the investment;with double moral hazard,when the proportion of venture capitalists＇ supervision is smaller than the critical value and the effect of supervision from venture capitalist is greater than the effect of the added service function,venture capitalists＇ supervision makes their optimal effortlevel and proportion of optimal rights allocation become higher;entrepreneurs＇ overconfidence makes their optimal effort level become higher while the proportion of venture capitalists＇ optimal rights allocation will be reduced.