中文摘要：

标准必要专利垄断企业对中国本土企业的歧视性专利许可收费是反垄断执法中的重点和难点。本文针对华为诉IDC公司案、高通公司案。运用纵向寡头博弈模型证明，专利垄断企业歧视性许可收费会对下游低成本企业索要高许可费，这抑制了低成本企业的竞争优势，降低了低成本企业的产量和市场份额，阻碍低成本企业技术创新，其总体上是降低社会福利的。因此，歧视性高许可费是应该受到反垄断法禁止的伤害竞争行为。歧视性许可费的反垄断审查应主要依据FRAND原则做出判定，由于缺乏公认的“合理许可费”确定方法和执法机构的信息缺乏，反垄断机构应避免直接规定“合理的”许可费水平，应重在维护微观主体的自由谈判交易机制的有效性，反垄断审查可采用三部结构的许可滥用审查方法，反垄断执法应主要采用仲裁机制来解决许可费争议，反垄断救济应该坚持“干预价格机制不干预价格水平”的原则。

英文摘要：

The discriminatory patent license fee of monopoly enterprises of standard essential patents on Chinese enterprises has become a key hot issue and difficulty in antitrust law enforcement. Taking the Huawei v. IDC lawsuit and Qualcomm Incorporated case as examples, this paper demonstrates discriminatory patent license fee of patent monopoly enterprises may claim higher license fee from downstream low-cost enterprises, which inhibits Chinese firms＇ advantage of low cost, reduces the output and market share of Chinese firms, and hinder technological innovation of low-cost enterprises, and reduce social welfare. Therefore, discriminatory higher license fee should be banned by antitrust laws. The key to antitrust law enforcement is not the higher price of patent firms but the discriminatory pricing. The antitrust law enforcement should avoid directly stipulating the level of patent license fee, the reasonable license fee should be determined by inter-enterprise negotiations under antitrust intervention, antitrust review should take three-parts structure method, relief measure should take the principle that intervention price mechanism does not interfere with the price level.