中文摘要：

本文以中国汽车行业转售价格维持的典型案例为基础，构建了对主产品和辅产品均实行转售价格维持的双重转售价格维持博弈模型。研究发现，与传统单一产品转售价格维持下的经典结论相悖．双重转售价格维持不但不能产生消除双重加价效果，反而有可能在辅产品上产生新的“双重加价”。甚至产生比双重加价更糟糕的福利结果。本文的基本结论是。双重转售价格维持会明显损害消费者在辅产品市场上的福利。在寡头竞争的市场中,企业通过转售价格维持可以做到将主产品市场上由于差异化而形成的市场势力传递到替代性极强的辅产品市场。中国汽车行业的反垄断政策应考虑禁止整车企业在维修、保养等售后服务市场上对4S店的转售价格维持．破除整车企业限制4S店从上游零部件制造商直接拿货的行规．同时允许独立维修商进入汽车售后市场，以形成4S店之间以及4S店与独立维修商之间在汽车售后市场上的竞争格局，并以反垄断法的有效执行来维护市场竞争秩序。

英文摘要：

The paper builds a model, based on China＇s auto industry, to describe a game process in which resale price maintenance （RPM） exists not only in main products but in subsidiary products. It concludes that this dual RPM may lead to additional double marginalization on subsidiaries rather than removing the original one, even get worse. It is very opposite to the classical result of traditional research on single-product RPM. The basic conclusion is that dual RPM may hurt consumers＇ welfare obviously in subsidiaries market. Specifically, dual RPM enables an oligopoly enterprise to transfer its market power generating from differentiation of main products to subsidiary products market that is of much higher substitutability. It suggests that anti-trust policy of China＇s auto industry prohibits auto enterprises to apply RPM into 4S stores after-sale service market; breaks up the convention of limiting 4S stores purchase components and parts from upstream suppliers directly. Meanwhile, it should be allowed that independent maintenance firms enter after-sale market to realize full competition between 4S stores, 4S store and independent firms. The expected competition market requires effective enforcement of anti-trust law.