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中文摘要：
研究了供应链订货与营销渠道的协调问题，考虑了零售商具有订货成本缩减和营销投资成本，建立了供应链订货与营销渠道协调的Stackelberg主从对策模型。这一模型中，主方零售商具有产品零售价格和投资决策权，从方供应商具有产品批发价格决策权。分析了零售商四种投资策略，针对每种投资策略下的协调模型进行了数值仿真，结果表明在零售商订货成本缩减和营销之间进行投资协调能够同时增加零售商和供应商利润。
英文摘要：
The problem on supply chain ordering and naarketing channel coordination is studied with the consideration of a retailer who has the ordering cost reducing and marketing investment, and the Stackelberg game models for ordering and marketing channel coordination in supply chain are developed. In these models, the retailer, as a leader, has the right to decide the retail price and investment decision, while the supplier, as a follower, has the right to decide the wholesale price. Four investment policies of retailer are analyzed and simulations are done aiming at each coordination model under each investment policy. The results show that adopting coordination between ordering cost reducing and marketing can both improve the retailer＇s and supplier＇s profits.
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