中文摘要：

为了研究政府的干涉措施对企业各成员决策的影响，以及如何协调干涉措施下的闭环供应链，首先比较了有政府干涉和无政府干涉下闭环供应链的决策结果，得到政府通过设定合理的奖惩力度和最低回收量，可以激励制造商和零售商的回收行为。在政府对制造商的回收行为实施干涉时，为了提高闭环供应链效率，引入收入一费用共享契约，使得分散决策下制造商和零售商的利润均得到了提高，实现了再制造闭环供应链系统的协调。

英文摘要：

This paper studies how the intervening measure of the government affects the decisions of members in supply chain, and how closed-loop supply chain is coordinated under the government intervention. Firstly, the decision results of closed-loop supply chain with government intervention are compared with those without government intervention. It shows that by setting reasonable intensity of premium and penalty and the lowest recovery amount, the government can encourage the recycling behavior of manufacturers and retailers. Then, under the government intervention, the revenue-and-expense sharing contract is introduced to improve the efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain. It is interesting to find that the revenue-and-expense sharing contract can not only improve profits of manufacturers and retailers, but also coordinate the entire closed-loop supply chain.