中文摘要：

首先构建了一次交易供应链协调问题中基于一般性假设下非对称信息甄别的供应链次最优（Second-best）协调模型，论证了系统最优协调不可得，之后将供应链一次交易关系拓展至长期合作关系，提出了关于供应链协调问题的“长期合作期望”这一研究立足点，在此基础上通过考察两类具体子问题，揭示了长期合作背景下供应链上下游企业之间的重复主从博弈对信息非对称时的供应链协调问题的影响：若代理人（零售商）私有信息具有跨期关联、且事后不可验证，则将造成信息甄别的棘轮效应；若私有信息在事后有可能被识别，则在委托人（制造商）的触发战略（Trigger Strategy）激励下供应链Pareto最优协调能否达到取决于事后被识别的概率、零售商的信息租金、对称信息下自身的收益以及无伙伴关系时的保留效用之间的数量关系，论文给出了上述各个结论相应的定量分析与描述。

英文摘要：

This thesis firstly studies one-off supply chain cooperation involving screening asymmetric information of common hypothesis, and constructs a Second-Best coordination model to prove that it is impossible to realize the absolute optimal coordination in such an occasion. Then, extending the one-off relationship to a long-term cooperation, the thesis reveals that repeated Stackelberg Games between the upper and the lower have an influence on supply chain coordination with asymmetric-information in a long-term background. If the agent＇ s （ retailer＇ s） private information of one season is associated with that of other seasons, and cannot be testified in the next season, ratchet effect will be resulted in information screening. However, if the private information is likely to be identified, whether the supply chain, with an incentive of the principal＇ s （ mannfacutility when there is no cooperation. This thesis provides corresponding quantitative descriptions for all these conclusions respectively.