中文摘要：

如何发挥地下金融的正面作用、削弱其负面影响是当前金融学和公共管理学研究的一个重要课题。本研究基于契约理论的视角，从地下金融融资活动内在的履约机制和外在的组织形式出发分析了地下金融潜在的风险特征和有效的治理策略。据此，我们提出了一种“选择性的”、“有条件的”融资契约保护制度。这种制度可以逼迫地下金融活动浮出水面．简单来说就是对那些愿意真实披露融资细节的契约提供法律保护。而对那些不愿意披露的契约不提供法律保护．从而监管当局可以根据这些自愿披露的真实交易信息对地下金融活动进行监控．这一研究结果对于监管当局针对地下金融活动制定有效监管政策具有一定的借鉴意义．

英文摘要：

Under the perspective of Contract theory, and based on the analysis of underground finance＇s implicit contract enforcement mechanisms and explicit organization forms, this paper focus on the risk and governance strategy in underground financing. We put forward a ＂selective＂ or ＂conditional＂ financing contract protection institution, which can force the underground finance get out of the ground, i.e. The regulator should protect the contract in which the contractor would like to real the information about financing transaction, and do not protect the contract in which the contractor don＇t real the information about financing transaction. So the regulator can control the underground financing behavior according to the voluntarilv revealed information.