本文以产权经济学为背景,重新审视了我国转型经济中的审计融资契约有用性,研究发现相对于国有企业,审计意见对非国有企业的融资约束缓解作用更为显著,并且市场化程度越低这一作用越显著,进而反映了转型经济下国有企业融资中政府软约束对审计的替代作用,从融资契约角度为国有企业普遍缺乏审计意见产品的自主性需求提供了理论解释,对改善政府干预后果,促进非国有企业融资和发展具有实践价值。
Based on property economics, this paper focuses on the effect of the audit to the financing contract in the transitional economy. The research tells that contrary to the SOEs, the effect of the audit opinion to the financing restrain is more useful to the non-SOEs. On the basis of the proceeding findings, it also discloses the effect from institutional characteristic of the transitional economy that with the worse of the external market conditions for development, the outcome will be more significant. These findings reflect the replacement of the political relationship to the audit, and explain that the lack of the voluntary demand of the audit opinion in the SOEs. Finally, this paper will be helpful to change the audit demand model directed by the government, and also to improve the financing ofnon-SOEs.