中文摘要：

政府规制的本意是消除市场失灵,保护公共利益。但由于规制机构本身存在的利益驱动,他们完全有可能被产业俘获。为了防止俘获,政府机构设置具有规制权力分离的性质,这种设置被作为防止俘获与合谋的机制。本文总结了近二十年来在新规制经济学框架中发展起来的规制俘获理论以及防止俘获的规制分离理论,并提供了大量实证研究的成果。

英文摘要：

The original object of government regulation is to eliminate market failure and protect public interest, but the regulation agency may be captured by industries because their private interests. To avoid capture, the settlement of government organization has the nature of multiple regulators as a capture-proof mechanism. This paper summarizes the theory of regulatory capture and the separation of regulators developed in the framework of new regulation economics in last twenty years, and provides substantial achievements of some empirical studies.