中文摘要：

产业组织间合谋问题包含产业垂直间及水平间合谋。转售价控制作为产业垂直间合谋竞争者地位主要差异表现,其整体经济价值的决定在动态竞争环境下面临着原有合谋解的瓦解和新合谋解达成的可能。本文理论证明,动态竞争环境下两家同质化的制造商分别使用各自的服务商体系其结果可能会带来更大的行业整体利润。本文应用动态面板技术,以中国最具活力的两个三角地区为实证对象进行验证,从社会整体福利角度证明这种非合谋方式是更有效率的。本文得出的结论主要有两个：一是从组织间的垂直联系看,合谋是一种非效率活动,且各自服务商有非合谋的冲动,其冲动能力大小与企业创新外部性和服务商的谈判力密切相关;二是间接证明了制造业与服务业的合谋更多的是一种经济价值分割而非创造,现有的产业间垂直关联是脆弱非平衡态,这种非平衡态存在着临界条件。本文基于上述结论提出了相应的建议和对策。

英文摘要：

Industrial organizational level product contains vertical and horizontal collusion between the conspiracies.As the difference between the performances of the product vertical collusion contender status,the resale price controls determine their economic values in a dynamic environment multitasking conflicts by facing possible collapse to reach solutions to existing and new conspiracy solution.This paper shows that the two homogenization manufacturers use their service provider system in dynamic competitive environment,which may lead to some greater overall industry profits.By applied game theory and dynamic panel technology to China＇s most dynamic regions of two triangular objects,the non-collusion is more economically efficient manner from the perspective of overall social welfare.From the vertical links between organizations,the conspiracy is a non-efficiency activity and each non-collusion impulses service provider,which relates to their ability of negotiations and innovation externalities.This paper indirectly proves that collusion manufacturing and service industries are economic value segmentation instead of economic value creators.The existing inter-industry vertical association is a non-fragile equilibrium.This paper also provides some corresponding suggestions.