中文摘要：

上游企业对批发价格的定价能力会根据中间产品特征、上下游的纵向势力等因素而改变。不同的批发价格直接影响了下游企业在最终产品市场上的竞争力和销售利润,进而可能会影响独占交易排挤竞争对手的条件。针对这一假说,构建上游一家在位者和一家潜在进入者,下游两家竞争性买方的纵向市场结构模型,考察不同批发价格定价策略下,在位者排挤潜在进入者的条件。结果表明：不同批发价格定价策略下,独占交易排他的条件存在很大差异,但始终与下游竞争程度和在位者进入者的成本差异有关。特别地,当上游在位者与潜在进入者边际成本差异较小、且下游买方竞争较为激烈时,在位者总是可以成功排挤潜在进入者,可称这种情况为独占交易排他的稳健区域。实践中,独占交易的调查和甄别都较为困难,反垄断的执法成本较高,反垄断机构针对独占交易的规制重点应该放到下游市场竞争激烈且上游边际成本差异较小的产业中。

英文摘要：

The features of intermediate product, vertical power between upstream and downstream and some other similar factors can lead to the difference in ability of pricing in upstream manufactures. What’s more, the ability of wholesale pricing will influence directly the competition and sale profits of downstream in the final product market. From this perspective, the ability of wholesale pricing will impact the conditions of exclusive dealing. As to this hypothesis, this paper built a vertical market model which consists of an incum-bent and an entrant in the upstream, and two buyers in the downstream. With this model, we studied the con-ditions of successfully exclusive dealing under different wholesale price strategy. The study finds that the con-ditions of successfully exclusive dealing different markedly under different wholesale price strategy, but they al-ways have something to do with the competition in the downstream and the difference of marginal cost in the upstream. Especially, when the difference of marginal cost in the upstream is small, and the competition in the downstream is fierce, the incumbent always can exclude the entrant out of the market successfully. We de-fined this situation as robust area of exclusive dealing. In the practice of antitrust, it is difficult to find the ex-clusive dealing between firms and it also costs a lot to do so, the finds of this paper imply that the institutions of antitrust can focus themselves on the exclusive dealing behaviors in the industries that upstream marginal cost is small and downstream competition is fierce.