上网价格政策(FIT)与配额制(RPS)是可再生能源电力产业中最常见的两种规制方法。本文分别在两种规制手段下构建了一个两阶段的寡头博弈模型,并给出均衡解,再运用数值模拟的方法对两种规制手段效果进行比较。结果表明:在提高可再生能源产量(装机容量)以及激励基于成本节约的R&D投入方面,上网价格政策要优于配额制;而在降低碳排放量以及提高消费者剩余方面,配额制规制手段要更胜一筹。但两种方式的社会总福利大小无法进行衡量,这取决于负外部性的大小。
Feed-in tariff and renewable portfolio standard are the two most popular regulatory methods in renewable energy industry. By establishing a two-stage model where monopoly firm first chooses RD input and then the quantity of energy,this paper compares the different effects of two regulatory policies: feed-in tariff and renewable portfolio standard. The results show that FIT is more effective than RPS at increasing the quantity of renewable energy( installed capacity) and stimulating RD input based on cost saving,whereas RPS policy is more effective at reducing carbon emissions and improving consumer surplus. Apart from existing findings,we cannot obtain the accurate conclusion that whose social welfare is better under the two policies. It depends on the level of negative externality.