通过构建包含可再生能源企业、传统能源企业以及政府三方在内的三阶段动态博弈模型,比较可再生能源发电产业上网价格规制政策中三种定价类型:固定价格、不变溢价和可变溢价的规制效果。结果表明:三种主要定价类型下的最优价格存在差异,但定价类型的选择不影响社会福利的大小。不同偏好的政策制定者会根据不同政策出发点制定不同的定价类型,为解释为什么很多的定价类型会出现在不同的国家和地区提供依据。
By establishing a three-stage dynamic game model including renewable energy firm,traditional energy firm and government,this paper compares the different regulatory effects under three main Feed-in tariff regulation types including fixed price,constant-premium price,variable-premium price.We show that the optimal price levels under three main regulation types are different.But the choice of regulation type does not influence the optimal social welfare.So policymakers with different preferences may make regulation decisions in different ways.This successfully explains that many regulation types all exist in different countries.