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中文摘要：
本文以超市和农户组成的一个二级农超对接供应链为基础,基于委托代理理论构建了信息不对称情况下超市对农户的激励模型,并对模型进行分析和求解。结果表明,提高农户的产出系数、降低农户付出努力的成本系数、降低农户的绝对风险规避度以及密切关注外界不确定因素都可以降低超市的总代理成本,同时增加超市的期望效用和农户的期望收入。
英文摘要：
Based on the two- stage farming- supermarket docking consisting of farmers and supermarket and the principal- agent theory,this paper builds an incentive model of supermarket to farmers in the asymmetric information,and then analyzes and solves the model. The results showed that increasing farmers＇ output coefficient,reducing the cost coefficient of farmers＇ effort,reducing farmers＇ absolute risk aversion degree and paying close attention to the outside world of uncertainty can reduce the general cost of supermarket and increase the expected utility of the supermarket and the expectations of farmers＇ income at the same time.
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