中文摘要：

自然资源是一种典型的公共物品具有显著的外部性特征,破坏者不用承担后果,而保护者得不到回报,因此必须通过生态补偿理顺环境与经济关系,实现自然资源的可持续利用。利用非对称演化博弈模型对自然资源开发方和受益方生态补偿博弈的演化稳定策略及影响因素进行研究。结果显示,如果缺乏上级部门的行政制约博弈双方会陷入＂囚徒困境＂无法形成有效合作。自然资源生态补偿博弈能否实现（保护、补偿）的合作均衡,主要受行政惩罚力度、生态补偿额度、生态保护收益及生态补偿交易成本等因素的影响。提高生态保护的综合收益、合理确定生态补偿额度、加大违约罚款额度、降低生态补偿的交易成本将有利于自然资源生态补偿机制向全面合作方向演进。

英文摘要：

Natural resources are typical public goods with the significant externalities,which means the destroyers of natural sources do not have to bear the consequences and the protectors have no returns,so it is necessary to straighten out the relationship between the environment and economy,and achieve the sustainable uses of natural resources by way of ecological compensation.Using the asymmetric evolutionary game model,this paper analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy and its influencing factors of the ecological compensation game between the natural resources developer and beneficiary.The results show that the gamers will fall into the ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ and they are unable to cooperate each other without the administrative constraints.There are some factors that determine whether the ecological compensation game can achieve cooperative equilibrium of protection and compensation;the main factors are administrative punishment,amount of ecological compensation,benefit of ecological protection,transaction costs of ecological compensation,and so on.In conclusion,ecological compensation mechanism would be facilitated towards the full cooperation in condition that the comprehensive income of ecological protection can be improved,and the amount of ecological compensation reasonably determined;on the other hand,the amount of liquidated fines should be higher while the transaction costs of ecological compensation lower.