中文摘要：

基于传统管理理论和方法，尝试从复杂适应系统理论的自组织演化视角探讨企业联盟中两种可以增强惩罚的合作规范机制，即规范的内化和专用性投资。在公共品演化博弈框架下，构建带有利他性惩罚机制的理论数学模型，深刻剖析两种机制对企业联盟利他性惩罚行为演化的影响，通过多Agent数值仿真进行检验。研究结果表明，规范的内化通过降低合作者的惩罚执行成本增强惩罚，专用性投资通过降低合作者的惩罚执行成本和增加对搭便车者惩罚行为的伤害能力增强惩罚，两种机制均在促进企业联盟合作的自组织演化过程中发挥重要作用，能够为企业联盟的合作提供具体的规范实施指导。

英文摘要：

Based on traditional management theories and methods and from a self-organization evolution perspective of Complex A-daptive System theory , this study attempts to explore two cooperation norm mechanisms , i.e.internalization of norms and specific investments , which can improve punishment .Within the framework of evolutionary game of public goods , the paper builds a the-oretical mathematical model with altruistic punishment mechanisms to profoundly analyze the impacts of the two mechanisms on the evolution of altruistic punishment behaviors in enterprise alliances , and tests the model by multi-Agent numerical simulation . The results show that internalization of norms improves punishment by reducing punishment execution cost of cooperators , and the specific investment improves punishment by reducing punishment execution cost of cooperators and by increasing damages of pun -ishment behaviors of free riding .The two mechanisms do play important roles in self-organization evolution process of promoting enterprise alliance cooperation , which provides specific implementation guides for cooperation norms of enterprise alliance .