中文摘要：

大型体育设施供给不足制约了我国群众体育事业的发展,如何改善大型公共体育设施建设和运营模式是解决该问题的关键。借助信息经济学的委托代理理论,从政府与社会投资者两个利益主体行为入手,构建了一个非对称信息下委托代理模型对我国大型体育设施的委托代理运营模式进行研究。研究表明,政府围绕最优体育基础设施供给量设计激励机制可降低场馆的委托代理风险;政府与社会投资者博弈的结果使二者在提高努力水平和降低成本方面目标较为一致,在风险规避程度上有所不同,政府应注意维护自身信誉以寻求长期利益;提高社会投资者努力水平系数、降低成本系数和绝对风险规避程度是理顺体育场馆委托代理关系进而增加体育设施有效供给的关键因素。结合这些结论,提出了包括建立投资者绩效评价机制、加强政府监管、鼓励企业创新性经营和约束政府行为在内的一系列对策。

英文摘要：

Insufficient supply of public sports facilities restricted the development of sports in China.The key to solve the problem is how to improve the construction of public sports facilities and operation mode.With the principal-agent theory of information economy,this article starts from the analysis on the interest body behaviors between the government and social investors,and construct a principal-agent model under asymmetric information to explore the principal-agent of China’s major sports facilities.The study shows the incentives designed around the optimal sports facilities supply can reduce the risk of stadium principal-agent.The result of the game between the government and social investors makes two sides are more consistent in the target of working harder and reducing cost.But they have different degree of risk aversion.The government should pay attention to maintaining its reputation for long-term interests.The key factors to straighten out the stadium agency relationship and increase the effective supply of sports facilities is improve the coefficient of the efforts level of social investors and reduce the coefficient of costs and the degree of the absolute risk aversion.With these conclusions,we propose to establish the performance evaluation mechanism of the investors,strengthen the government supervision,encourage the innovation management of the enterprise and restrain government behavior and so on.