中文摘要：

根据我国水电工程施工安全管理特点，借助多任务和多重委托代理理论分析框架，构建施工安全管理的目标函数，根据激励约束、参与约束等约束条件求解激励模型．通过分析模型stackelbe唱博弈均衡解的特征，发现在“安全事故一票否决制”条件下，工程建设和施工安全管理的最优业绩报酬也具有相互独立性，且最优业绩报酬是绝对风险规避度、边际激励成本变化率和可观测变量方差的递减函数，最后通过算例分别讨论了政府与工程项目部的激励参数，以期为中国水电工程施工安全监管和实践提供理论借鉴．

英文摘要：

To prevent major accidents fundamentally in hydropower constructions, it＇s necessary to a design incentive mechanism for construction safety management. The characteristics of hydropower construction are analyzed to seek for multitasking and multiple-agency relationship in safety management. According to the participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint, an incentive model is constructed to optimize the overall safety goals. The equilibrium solution of this model implies that the optimum performance pay between engineering construction and safety management is mutually independent under the condition of one-vote negation system concerning safety accidents. Simultaneously, the optimum performance pay is a decreasing function of the absolute risk aversion, the change rate of marginal incentive cost and the observable variables variance. Finally, an example is given to discuss the incentive parameters of the government and the project department.