中文摘要：

中国过去30多年的经济增长奇迹中，地方政府发挥了重作用。一种合意的解释缘于财政激励和晋升激励的官员激励设计。本文基于官员激励的框架，分析地方债务形成发展的逻辑，阐明官员行为、地方债务与经济增长之间的联系，并对中国现有的债务驱动经济发展的模式进行反思。后续研究中国地方债务，需结合更微观的数据来揭示地方债务的传导链条以及可能存在的问题和风险。

英文摘要：

Over the past thirty years, local officials play an important part on the economic growth miracle. Official＇s incentive design including fiscal incentive and promotion incentive provides a reasonable explain. Based on the framework of official＇s inventive, this paper analyzes the logic of local government debts come into being, classifies the relationship among official＇s behavior, local government debts and economic growth. And this paper also rethinks the pattern of China economic development driven by debts. Further research on the local government debts should use micro-data to reveal the transmission chain of local government debts as well as the potential issues and risks.