中文摘要：

近年来,上市公司业绩持续下滑与高管薪酬差距快速上升的反向变动日益引发公众 的质疑和学者的关注.在权变效应视角下,从知识管理领域中引入“高管团队知识合作需求”概 念为调节变量,通过分析中国2009-2012年制造业上市公司非平衡面板数据,验证并探讨知识合 作需求对经理自主权与高管薪酬差距关系的调节效应作用机理.结果表明,中国制造业上市公司 高管团队知识合作需求能够显著削弱经理自主权对高管薪酬差距的正向操纵效应.因此,高知识 合作需求时,高管薪酬差距决策权更大程度上应归属CEO;而低知识合作需求时,高管薪酬差距 决策权要牢牢掌控在董事会手中为好.

英文摘要：

Recently,the simultaneous existence of the two opposite facts,i.e.persistent decline of firm performance and rapid growth of executives^ompensation gap,has received much attention both from the public and the scholars.The paper investigates the moderating effect of knowledge coordination needs within TMT on the relationship between managerial discretion and executives compensation gap by adopting the data of Chinese listed firms in manufacturing industry from 2009-2012.The conclusions from the data analysis are as follows：Knowledge coordination needs,on the whole,negatively moderates the relationship between managerial discretion and executives1 compensation gap in Chinese listed firms in manufacturing industry.So when knowledge coordination needs within TMT is higher,the decision-making power should be delegated to CEO;while when knowledge coordination needs within TMT is lower,the decision-making power should be held in the hands of the Board.