中文摘要：

开放平台和封闭平台在信息行业快速发展的背景下备受关注，而且对传统行业的分析表明这两类平台的资源配置模式在很多行业中普遍存在。现有文献对平台本身以及最终消费者的研究非常充分．本文将研究视角转向处于二者之间的下游厂商。鉴于下游厂商的数量远逊于最终消费者．众多文献关注的“网络效应”对于下游厂商的平台决策意义不大。在将不同类型平台界定为“需求优势”和“成本优势”的基础上．本文将完全信息动态（产量）博弈的结果作为支付．构建了一个平台选择的不完全信息动态博弈模型。分析结果表明：在分离策略下，如果先行动的厂商不按照需求优势选择平台类型，则不存在博弈均衡。如果先行动厂商按照需求选择平台类型．则需求优势越大．后动厂商越倾向于选择封闭平台：成本优势越大，越倾向于选择开放平台。在混同策略下。当先动厂商始终选择开放平台时，如果高需求的非均衡路径概率比事前概率大得越多，需求优势越大，成本优势越大，那么后动厂商越倾向于选择开放平台：否则．越倾向于选择封闭平台。当先动厂商始终选择封闭平台时．如果高需求的事前概率比非均衡路径的概率大得越多，需求优势越大，成本优势越小，那么，后动厂商越倾向于选择封闭平台；否则，越倾向于选择开放平台。

英文摘要：

Because of the rapid development of information industry,open platform and closed platform has been concerned by more and more people. The analysis of traditional industries shows that the resource allocation model of this two types of platform is ubiquitous in many industries. The study of the platform itself and the final consumer is very comprehensive, but this paper will study the downstream manufacturers. In view of the number of downstream manufacturers is far less than the final consumer, therefore, the ＂network effect＂, which is get many literatures attention, is of little significance in platform decision-making of the downstream manufacturers. On the basis of defining different types of platforms as ＂demand advantage＂ and ＂cost advantage＂, this paper constructs a dynamic game model of incomplete information based on taking the result of complete information dynamic production game as the payment. The results of model analysis show that under the separation strategy, if the first manufacturers do not follow the demand advantage to select the platform type, there is no game equilibrium. If the first manufacturers choice platform type in accordance with the needs of demand advantage, the greater the demand advantage, the more likely the second manufacturer tend to choose a closed platform; the greater the cost advantage, the more likely the second manufacturer tend to choose an open platform. In the mixed equilibrium., when the first manufacturer always choose the open platform, if the high demand＇s non-equilibrium path probability is greater than prior probability, and the greater the demand advantage, the greater the cost advantage, then the more likelythe second manufacturers choose to open platform; otherwise, the more inclined to choose a closed platform. When the first manufacturers always choose to close the platform, if the high demand＇s prior probability is greater than the probability of non-equilibrium path, and the greater the demand advantage, the smaller the cost advantage, th