以2001年至2007年A股上市公司为样本,从我国特有的制度背景出发探讨了政府干预对公司多元化经营行为及其经济后果的影响。实证结果表明,由于政府对政治目标的考虑及管理者对权力的追求,使得政府干预程度较高的上市公司更倾向于实行多元化经营。此外,与政府干预程度较低的上市公司相比,在政府干预程度较高的上市公司中实施多元化经营会导致更为严重的多元化折价问题。
With the data of listed companies from 2001 to 2006, this thesis analysis the relationship between state intervention and corporate diversification discounts. The results show that government intervention is positively related to corporate diversification, because of the purse of political object and benefits of managers. And the author finds that the government intervention is positively related to corporate diversification discounts, which means when the government intervention is stronger the discount is larger, because of the agency problem.