中文摘要：

不同的审计师选聘权配置将影响注册会计师的独立性。控股股东是否会与审计委员争夺审计师选聘权以获取信息优势？不同产权性质企业面临的审计需求差异和投票权的差异是否会影响审计师的选聘权安排？研究发现,控股股东会利用股东控制权侵占审计委员会审计师选聘权;股东控制权对审计委员会审计师选聘权的侵占在国有企业显著而在非国有企业并不显著;股东投票控制权的大小对不同产权性质的上市公司审计师选聘权的行使会产生不同的影响。

英文摘要：

Different allocation of auditor choice rights will affect auditor＇s independence. Whether or not the controlling shareholder will enter into rivalry with the audit committee over auditor choice rights for the sake of information advantages？ Can the difference demand of external audit and the difference of voting right will affect the allocation of auditor choice rights. We find that the controlling shareholder will expropriate the audit committee＇s auditor choice rights. This expropriation is significant in State-owned Enterprises but the non-State-owned Enterprises not. And the different voting right of shareholders will also affect the auditor choice rights in different ownership enterprises.