中文摘要：

私募股权投资已成为活跃在国际资本市场上的新兴力量,因其高度参与所投资企业的经营管理而带来的公司治理优化效应日益受到广泛重视。但是,对我国上市公司的相关研究发现：由于契约短期性等限制,私募股权的参与并未发挥公司治理优化效应,反而加剧了正向盈余管理;私募股权参与的上市公司盈余管理的方式更隐蔽,应计盈余管理及真实盈余管理兼而有之,且真实盈余管理的程度要高于应计盈余管理的程度;声誉、是否联合投资等私募股权特征显著影响上市公司盈余管理。据此,要发挥私募股权投资在优化公司治理、净化资本市场的积极作用,相关制度设计须兼顾有效约束私募基金因投资契约而做出的短视行为。

英文摘要：

In view of insufficient academic research on private equity investment in listed companies confronted with current vigorous practice development, and based on the sample of private equity institutions invested into the listed companies between 2001 and 2011, this paper discusses the influence mechanism and the effect of private equity on earnings management of listed companies. The results show that due to some restrictions such as short-term contract, instead of optimizing the effects of corporate governance, PE exacerbates the positive earnings management. Also, the way of PE participating in earnings management is more hidden-there is a concurrence of accrued and real earnings management, and the degree of real earnings management is higher than accrued earnings management. Further, PE characteristics such as reputation and joint investment significantly affect earnings management of listed companies. Accordingly, the relevant system design is necessary in order to prompt PE to play a positive role in optimizing the corporate governance and purifying the capital market.