中文摘要：

本文引入微分对策博弈模型,研究银行与企业之间的信贷博弈问题,破解企业融资困境。通过建立银行和企业的各自收益目标函数,讨论了银行区域内不合作和合作状况下,银行最优的动态信贷资金供应量和利率策略,企业动态信贷资金使用策略;研究了区域内银行间的合作联盟问题,提出合作联盟的利益共享。在银行区域内不合作情况下,银行信贷资金供应量增加,信贷资金利率上升趋势得到抑制,企业违规概率增加。利率和信贷资金供应量呈负相关关系。在银行区域合作情况下,银行间合作可防止企业囤积资金和贷款用途违规概率的上升,减少违规惩罚成本,促进企业积极履约。引入利益共享机制,解决了银行合作稳定问题,明确了优势企业和劣势企业的融资策略。

英文摘要：

On the circumstance of that banks generally adopt ＂credit crunch＂ strategy, in this paper financing game between banks and enterprises is investigated to solve financing problem by conducting Stackelberg differential game model. Through establishing bank and enterprises＇ on-target function respectively, banks＇ optimal dynamic loan supply and interest rate strategies, enterprises＇ dynamic loan use strategy are discussed in the case of that with and without local banks cooperation, and the problem of alliance in local banks is studied with purpose of achieving benefit-sharing. The result has demonstrated that in the case of that without local banks cooperation, banks＇ loan supply increase, upward trend in credit interest rate is suppressed, probability of enterprises default increases, and optimal interest rate strategy is that credit interest rate and credit funds supply are negatively correlated. In the case of that with local banks cooperation, upward trend in enterprises default probability is suppressed, penalty costs of enterprises default decrease, the enterprises will more willing to exercising the obligation. Simultaneously, benefit-sharing mechanism establish optimal financing strategies for both superior and inferior players to solve the problem related to banks cooperation stability, and also provide a efficient path to solve financing dilemma, ensuring credit market healthy and prosperous.