中文摘要：

补贴是我国政府在节能减排领域常见的政策手段之一．本文借助信号博弈理论探究了政府与企业在节能减排补贴申请与发放过程中双方策略的选择与依存性变化，据此及节能减排效果影响因素，建立了动态方程．首先根据不同策略下各方得益情况确定在市场完全成功情况下，分析了实现均衡状态的充分条件；然后借助随机微分方程理论，以分离均衡状态作为初始状态，探究该状态得以保持稳定并延续所需满足的约束条件，依据所构建理论模型分析了补贴额、违规成本、积极性挫伤损失实现分离均衡的最优边界，并运用Matlab软件做数值模拟以验证模型的有效性，为改善减排效果提供理论上的借鉴与指导．

英文摘要：

This paper explores the choices and changes of the dependence of strategies between the government and enterprises using signal game theory. According to the above and influential factors of energy conservation and emission reduction, we establish a dynamic equation. First, we determine the sufficient condition for a- chieving the state of equilibrium under the circumstance of complete success according to the benefits of differ- ent parties. Then, taking the separating equilibrium as the initial state, we explore the constraints to keep that condition continuously stable with the help of stochastic differential equation. Based on the theoretical model constructed, we analyze the amount of subsidies, iUegal costs and loss of enthusiasm ical simulation to verify the validity of the model with the help of Matlab software to ences and guidances on improving the effect of emission reduction efficiently. dampened and do numer- provide theoretical refer-