中文摘要：

有效的政府监管是控制食品安全事件的重要途径．本文研究政府参与下多食品企业的监管策略，通过建立一对多的政府与食品企业对称博弈模型，探讨当食品企业个数增加时，政府监管存在的失灵现象及政府最佳监管策略．研究表明，企业的不自律边际收益会随着市场上食品企业的数量增加而增加，进而诱发更多的企业生产不安全食品，而现有的政府监管力度难以解决多企业的食品安全问题．同时，在政府与多食品企业的博弈过程中，检查频率、自律成本与不自律处罚是影响企业生产行为的重要因素，加大对企业的检查概率、减低企业自律成本、提高企业不自律的处罚是缓解食品安全问题的有效途径．

英文摘要：

Effective government regulation is an important approach to control food safety incidents. In this paper, we establish a symmetric game model to study the strategy choice of food enterprises under government participation, explore government regulation failures with the number of food enterprise increases. The research suggests that when the number of food enterprises increases on the market, the border earnings of non-self-discipline enterprises increase, more enterprises becomes non-self-discipline and provide unsafe food production; that is the reason why the fixed checking probability of government cannot adapt to the market situation where many food enterprises coexistence. In the game, inspect frequency of government, cost of self-discipline and punishment of non-self-discipline are the most important for enterprise which could affect the choice of behavior. In order to cope with the failure of the government regulation effectively, the government should increase inspect frequency, reduce the cost of self-discipline, and increase the punishment of non-self-discipline.