中文摘要：

主要研究了非对称信息下两级供应链的商业信用激励机制问题。运用机制设计理论和博弈论分析了信息对称时,基于商业信用的供应链成员的决策和收益;在此基础上,在零售商库存持有成本为非对称信息时,供应商设计商业信用激励机制;基于委托代理框架构建优化模型,采用最优控制理论中的Hamilton函数推导出最优商业信用契约。实例仿真验证了结论,比较了对称信息和非对称信息下供应链成员和系统的利润,讨论了激励机制对供应商和零售商利润的影响。

英文摘要：

This study is concerned with the incentive mechanism based on trade credit contract for a supply chain with asymmetric information,where the supply chain consists of a supplier and a retailer.First,the policies and profits of members are analyzed by using incentive mechanism theory and game theory under symmetric information.When the retailer owns private holding cost information,the supplier designs the incentive mechanism based on trade credit contract.We build an optimization model based on principalagent frame,and obtain the optimal trade credit policies by using the Hamilton function of the optimal control theory.In numerical simulation,we respectively compare the profits of members and of the whole supply chain with asymmetric information,with those with symmetric information,and discuss the influence of this incentive mechanism on both the supplier＇s and the retailer＇s profits.