中文摘要：

本文以我国证券市场的公开市场股份回购公司为研究对象，发现宣告进行公开市场股份回购的公司，存在股份回购前负向调整操纵性应计，在股份回购后正向调整操纵性应计的现象。公司采取这种行为是为了达到“在回购前压低股价，减少回购成本；回购后释放利润，提高股价”的目的。本文发现宣告股份回购本身是一种“偏负面”信号，企业在进行盈余管理和股份回购调整权益等一系列财务游戏之后，公司的经营业绩、财务表现和市场价值等无法获得本质改善，公司的发展前景并不乐观。在所有宣布回购的样本中，“真回购”公司的回购真正动机和宣告动机相似性较高，而“假回购”公司宣告回购目的背后还隐藏着其他动机。资本市场能够在一定程度上识别公司宣告股份回购是属于“真回购”还是“假回购”。

英文摘要：

This paper regards companies involved in open market repurchases in Chinese securities market as the research object and shows that the companies which declare open market repurchases negatively and positively manipulate discretional accruals be{ore and after the declaration of share repurchases respectively. The motive for corporate behavior above- mentioned is to depress share prices before the repurchases, thereby reducing repurchase costs, and increase the share prices after the repurchases, thereby releasing pro{its. This pa- per indicates that the declaration of share repurchase itself is a slightly negative signal. In the sample involing announcing share repurchases, the companies with genuine repurchases have similarities in real and declaration motives, while the companies with spurious repurchases have other motives {or the declaration of share repurchases. To a certain extent the capital market can distinguish between genuine and spurious share repurchases.