中文摘要：

解释中国的戏剧的经济生长，研究人员们建议了一篇比赛论文。根据这篇论文，自从政治提升大部分基于本地经济生长，中央政府设置生长目标的能力在生长起了一个关键作用。我们使用省的官员的事业活动性数据测试这篇论文。为两个时间时期(19791995 和 19792002 ) ，经济性能，在年度、平均、相对的学期测量了，没影响这些官员的事业前进。我们然后勾略一个其他的分析框架为 developmentalism 解释中国本地官员的强壮的冲动并且最后，从这个解释框架拉政策含意。

英文摘要：

To explain China＇s dramatic economic growth, researchers have proposed a ＂tournament thesis. ＂＂ According to this thesis, the central government＇s ability to set growth targets has played a crucial role in growth since political promotion is largely based on local economic growth. We use provincial officials＂ career mobility data to test this thesis. For both time periods （1979-1995 and 1979-2002）, economic performance, measured in annual, average and relative terms, did not affect these officials＇ career advancement. We then sketch an alternative analytical framework to explain Chinese local officials＇ strong urge for developmentalism and, finally, draw policy implications from this explanatory framework.