中文摘要：

采用深交所信息考评结果作为信息披露质量的代理变量，考量政府补贴的寻租行为及其有效性。实证显示，信息披露质量较低的企业，获得的政府补贴更多，但政府补贴无益于企业绩效和社会绩效的提高，从而支持了企业寻租假设。结果表明，信息透明度的提高有助于政府补贴资金的有效配置，提高社会整体福利。

英文摘要：

The paper chooses the ranking of disclosure quality made by Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the proxy variable of information disclosure level, analyzes the rent seeking behavior of government subsidy and its efficiency. The result shows there is a negative relationship between disclosure quality and government subsidy. However, the government subsidy seems not to be helpful to increase the firm performance and the social performance, which supports the assumption of rent seeking. Our results suggest that the improvement of information transparency is conducive to promoting effective allocation of government subsidy and increasing social welfare.