人民币贷款利率市场化改革是我国商业银行竞争格局形成的重要步骤。本文采用1998~2010年14家主要的全国性商业银行的面板数据,在建立联立方程模型利用似不相关回归技术对银行贷款价格竞争度指标Lerner指数进行计算的基础上,运用固定效应估计方法和Driseoll—Kraay稳健标准差,实证检验了银行价格竞争与其风险行为的关系。研究结果表明:(1)2004年10月贷款利率上限的放开成为商业银行深化价格竞争的开端;(2)现阶段,价格竞争有助于缓解银行的信贷风险,但对于其整体经营风险的控制并无显著影响;(3)利率上限的取消并不直接影响银行的信贷风险调整行为.不过却可能造成其阶段性的经营风险。
Lending rate marketization is an important step in the formation of China's banking competition. This paper empirically examines the relationship between banking price competition and risk-taking behavior, based on the estimation of Lemer Index, employing panel data from 14 main national commercial banks during 1998- 2010. The results show that : ( 1 ) the liberalization of lending rate ceiling on October 2004 becomes the beginning of deepening of banking price competition; (2) At present, price competition will help to ease banks' credit risk, while it doesn't have any significant impact on banks' operational risk ; (3) the cancellation of interest rate ceiling doesn't affect banks' credit risk-adjustment behavior directly, but it may cause temporal operational risk.