中文摘要：

该文借助DEA-Tobit面板数据模型,考察在中国式分权的制度背景下地方官员自利行为是如何影响环境治理效率的。结论是：1）财政分权与地方政府环境治理效率之间为负相关关系;2）地方官员自利行为大大降低了辖区的环境治理效率;3）从中国式分权与地方官员自利行为对环境治理效率的相互影响看,两者间的交互项回归系数的绝对值远远大于财政分权回归系数的绝对值,表明中国式分权在地方官员自利行为的叠加影响下严重削弱了政府的环境治理效率。

英文摘要：

Although the existing literature, many scholars have discussed the negative impact of the ＂ Chinese decentralization＂ brought about by environmental governance mechanism from theory, but the intrinsic conduction mechanism of quality of fiscal decentralization and environmental pollution control has not yet been thoroughly. In this paper, based on the perspective of local officials, focusing on institutional background Chinese decentralization of local officials self--interest behavior how to influence the efficiency of environmental governance, the main conclusions are： first, whether the technical efficiency, pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency as dependent variable, the coefficient of fiscal decentralization degree for the negative, and the coefficient is significant in the 10% level of significance. This shows that there was a negative correlation between fiscal decentralization and local government China environmental governance efficiency; second, the regression coefficient of local officials self--interest behavior we know, local officials self--interest behavior greatly reduces the area of environmental governance efficiency~ third, the emphasis on self--interest China decentralization and local officials mutual influence the efficiency of environmental governance, we found that the absolute value of the absolute value of the interaction term regression coefficient is far greater than the fiscal decentralization regression coefficient, the superposition China decentralization and local officials in the self interested behavior under the influence of the greatly strengthened the rule of weakening effect on environment management efficiency.