中文摘要：

本文通过建立电力规制模型来重点分析电网市场势力的形成机制，影响因素和经验测度。研究发现，不完美监督造成了“双赢互换型”规制失效和小工商业用户对耗电大户的交叉补贴，而区域异质，重复博弈，政绩考核多元化和工业结构的重型化倾向则会加剧“规制弱化效应”，从而增强电网的市场势力，提高其对于小工商业用户的电价水平，“厂网分开”的改革能否降低电网的市场势力则取决于竞价上网能否有效开展。在理论分析的基础上，我们提出了测算电网市场势力的方法和指标，并设计了一种电力产业改革的新思路：输配一体、售电竞争、有效接入、促进转型。

英文摘要：

A regulation model is established to analyze growth and dilemma during the reformation of China＇s electricity industry. The formation mechanism, influence factors and measure of power grid market power in China is discussed in detail. We find that the regulator lower the price and profit of power grid enterprise to develop economy. However, imperfect supervision leads to ＂win-win exchange＂ regulation failure and cross-subsidy from small customers to large departments. It is also found that regional disparity, repeated games, and industrial structure will aggravate regulation failure. Whether ＂structure separation＂ lowers market power depends on the net price. Next, we raise the methods on how to measure market power, and design a new way to reform electricity industry.