中文摘要：

我国社会基本养老保障制度区域政策差异显著，其政策形成是由地方政府主导并与中央政府、企业和民众利益博弈决策。各博弈主体均有不同利益诉求，分别表现为绩效考核、公共财政、经济发展与民生诉求，均对社会基本养老保障供给产生不同性质与大小作用力，而地方政府决策逻辑是在与各主体利益博弈基础上寻求平衡决策。在假设经济发展与民生诉求为固有矛盾前提下，现阶段地方决策是在公共财政与民生诉求间平衡，但当绩效考核与公共财政因素变化，或各利益诉求均有利于或均不利于社会基本养老保障提供的极端情况时，地方政府会有不同决策选择。

英文摘要：

The social basic pension system has significant regional difference and it is led by local govemment which makes decision after gaming with central government, enterprise and local residents in China. Each stakeholder has different interests, and it refers to performance appraisal, public finance, economic development and people＇s livelihood. Every demand on interest generates different force to provide basic pension system in quality and measurement, and the logic of local government＇s decision is to make a balance based on interest gaming. Given the fact economic development and people＇s livelihood are inherent contradiction, local government seeks a balance between public finance and livelihood of people currently. But when performance appraisal and public finance have changed one, two factors or in the extreme cases, local government has different decisions.