中文摘要：

为研究零售商不同决策情况下的定价推动型供应链各企业收益分配及其风险弹性问题,以博弈论的思想建立了由1个制造商和2个零售商组成的定价推动型供应链模型,分析各零售商不同的决策行为,构建各自的收益函数及其对成本的风险弹性,并给出了具体的数值模拟和分析.结果表明：供应链中,制造商和零售商的决策方式直接影响了他们的收益分配,制造商在零售商独立决策时候的收益更多,在零售商联合决策时候收益较少,而零售商的收益与制造商相反,另外在零售商联合决策的情况下,虽然零售商的收益增加,但供应链总体收益是减小的.最后,无论零售商是否同盟（联合决策）,制造商和零售商的收益对成本风险弹性保持一致,因而只能通过扩大市场容量、减小需求弹性、降低产品成本来降低他们的风险弹性.

英文摘要：

To study the mechanism of profit distribution and profit risk elasticity in a price-driven supply chain,a price-driven supply chain model consisting of one manufacturer and two retailers was proposed based on game theory.Different decision behaviors of the retailers were analyzed,and their respective profit functions and risk elasticity to cost were developed;numerical simulation and analysis were given.It was found that the decision pattern of the manufacturer and retailers in the supply chain directly influences their distribution of income.The manufacturer will gain more when the retailers make decisions independently and less when the retailers make decisions jointly;the income of retailers,on the other hand,displays the opposite trend.Additionally,when the retailers make decisions jointly,though the retailers＇ income is increased,the overall income of the supply chain decreases.In the end,this paper pointed out that whether the retailers are in alliance or not,the income of manufacturer and retailers is in accordance with the cost risk elasticity.Therefore,the risk elasticity can only be reduced by expanding the market capacity,reducing demand elasticity and product cost.